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SUPPLEMENf AL MEMO RE MEMO FROM SG
No. 72-312
Merrill, Lynch v. Ware(one of Jay's cases)
The Conference asked for the views of the SG.
The SG recommends that cert be denied, stating essentially
that the preemption issue was not properly presented
below.

As to the California statutory provision's

effect on federal antitrust laws, the SG statesa
"It is well-recognized that state laws preserving
competition can effectively complement federal
antitrust policy, and even, in the exercise of
the state's reserved police powers, go beyond it,
so long as the functioning of the federal system
is not disturbed."
The point of the latter argument is, I take it, that
the California law des violate the Commerce Clause
by unduly interfering with interstate commerce.
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1. SUMMATION.

The basic question is whether state laws

-~ermitting actions for the collection of wages to be maintained in a

p ~ ud~m ~~
withstand any

state laws prohibiting restraint on occupational changes

pr~emptive

effect of self regulating rules of the New York

Stock Exchange promulgated pursuant to § 6 of the Security Exchange
"
Act of 1934. The California Court of Appeals First Appellate District
concluded the state policies were paramount.
Court apparently declined review.

Petitioners seek review of the

decision of the California Court of Appeals.
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FACTS. In July 1958 Respondent became an employee of

petitioner Merrill Lynch at its San Francisco office as an account
executive, remaining until 1969 when he voluntarily terminated his
employment.
Lynch.

He then became an employee of a competitor with Merrill

As a full time employee of Merrill Lynch respondent was able

to participate in its profit sharing plan.

At the termination of his

employment respondent's account in the profit sharing fund was credited
\

with 733 vested units and 1, 258 unvested units.

Article 11. 1 of the

profit sharing plan provides:
A participant who, in the determination of the Committee,
voluntarily terminates his employment with the corporation
. . . and engages in an occupation which is, in the determination of the Committee, competitive with the corporation . . .
shall forfeit all rights to any benefits otherwise due or to
become due from the trust fund with respect to units credited
for fiscal years subsequent to the fiscal year ended December
30, 1960. "

I

On April 18, 1969 the administrative committee of the plan made a
determination that respondent had voluntarily terminated his employment
with Merrill Lynch and had entered into competitive employment.

Under

Article 11. 1 of the plan, the committee thereupon caused to be forfeited
any and all rights respondent had in the plan.
Merrill Lynch is a member of the New York Stock Exchange
which is registered under § 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which authorizes the enforcement of rules and bylaws promulgated
by such exchange.

3.
Under Rule 345 of the Exchange,, respondent executed a written
application for approval of employment and was approved and registered.

/

(_

On the application was written the following statement:
I agree that any controversy between me and any .
member organization arising out of my employment on
the termination of my employment by and with such . . .
member organization shall be settled by arbitration at
the instance of any such party in accordance with the
constitution and rules then obtaining of the New York
Stock Exchange.
At the time this form was executed by respondent, a rule of the Exchange
provided for arbitration of all matters arising out of the termination of
employment.
3. OPINION OF THE COURT BELOW. In the court below,
respondent contended that
arbitration agreement.

§

229 of the California Labor Code voided the

That section provides that:

Actiort>to enforce the collection of due and unpaid wages
claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard
to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.
The California court decided that the intent of the statute was to provide
in the first instance a judicial forum where t.here exists a dispute as

,,

.,

to wages.

The court then decided that the term wages should include

-

not only periodic monetary earnings of an employee but also the other

---

benefits to which he was entitled as a part of his compensation, such
as the profit sharing plan in question.
§

The court then decided that

229 and the strong state policy protected thereby voided the arbitration

clause in the application for employment.
Respondent also contended in the court below that the forfeiture
.;

provision is unlawful as a restraint of trade under th·e California

4.
(

Business and Professions Code

§

16600.

That section explicitly declares

that:
Every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of
any kind is to that extent void.
The California court then quickly decided that the above section voided
the forfeiture provision in Article 11. 1 of the Merrill Lynch profit
sharing plan.
4.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES. Petitioner.'B chief

contention is that the decision of the California court greatly interferes
with the desire of Congress, expressed in

---------

§

6 of the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934, to establish a statutory scheme of supervised self regulation
by stock exchanges.

Petitioner contends that the application of California

Labor Code 229 defeats that very objective and renders the self regulatory
rule of the exchange a nullity.

Petitioner analogizes this case to federal

labor law where petitioner contends the principle is firmly established
that incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles
of federal labor law.

Petitioner contends self regulation of the exchanges

is thwarted by any possibility that arbitration may or may not be
permitted under the laws of different states.

Petitioner contends that

uniformity can only be assured by permitting the self regulatory
arbitration provisions of the exchange to prevail over inconsistent local
laws and thereby fulfill the congressional objectives.

5.
Petitioner also contends that federal courts have consistently

(

upheld arbitration rules in the face of challenges under federal antitrust
laws to the conduct or acts or rules sought to be arbitrated.

Petitioner

contends that if federal antitrust laws cannot overcome the federal
policy of arbitration and self regulation, neither can similar state laws.
Petitioner contends that that part of the decision of the court
below which voided the forfeiture provision operated as an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce. Petitioner contends that its profit
sharing plan operates on a national and international level, that its
employees are engaged in interstate commerce, that except for three
states, others have upheld the forfeiture provision, and finally that
the decision of the court below leaves Merrill Lynch with the alternative
of maintaining two plans, one for California and one for the rest of
its personnel, national and international.
Petitioner concludes briefly that this case has great importance
for a large number of major corporations who have similar forfeiture
provisions in their profit sharing plans.
Respondents, in a seemingly disjoirled brief, contend this
decision does not involve application of any state or federal antitrust
laws.

Respondents' chief contention seems to be that the intent behind

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is to insure fair dealing and to
protect investors, and that the Act does not apply to situations involving

:~

.

6.
(

employer-employee relations within the securities industry, despite
the existence of any private arbitration agreement.

Respondents further

contend that the decision of the California Court of Appeals is not a
final order but is rather interlocutory in nature, since in point of fact
no judgment has been entered on the pleadings in this case.

Respondent

concedes, however, that such orders as this are made appealable under
the California Code of Civil Procedure.
5.

DISCUSSION.

At first blush this appears to present a

significant preemption question under
Act of 1934 (Appendix A).

§

6 of the Securities Exchange

There is no discussion in either the briefs

or the opinion below of the actual wording or legislative history of this
section of the Act.

Nor is any relevant precedent of this Court cited

by the parties which is helpful to the issues herein.

In the absence

of the above, I will hazard my own views as to why the preemption claim
petitioner makes may be deficient:
(1) Though some significant argument can be made that the
intent of

§

6 is to promote Exchange self regulation in the interest

of protecting the investing public, one could question whether a rule
which dealt not with protection of the investing public, but rather with
internal employment matters within the exchange claims the same
statutory protection.
(2) Unlike the Labor Management Relations Act, the Securities
Exchange Act does not of itself command arbitration.

The policy of

7.
(- \

arbitration thus finds support not in the wording of a federal statute but
rather in the rules of the exchange promulgated pursuant to very broad
statutory authority.
( 3) Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act does attach some

importance to the existence of state laws:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent
any exchange from adopting and enforcing any rule
not inconsistent with this chapter and the rules and
regulations thereunder and the applicable laws of the
state in which it is located. (emphasis added).
( 4) The -s'"ats hws which were used to strike down the forfeiture

provision of petitioner's profit sharing plan and the arbitration provision
of the Exchange promoted valid state interests: in the one case the

(

desire of California to make a judicial forum available for the settlement
of wage disputes in the first instance, and on the other the state interest
in protecting occuptional mobility for• its citizens. But just how far
and in what instances state interests can be allowed to fracture the
uniformity of the Exchange regulations seems an important question.
There is a response.
WILKINSON

APPENDIX

,,

STATUTORY PROV1SIONS INVOLVED
United States Code, Title 15:
§78f. Registration of national securities exchanges.
(a) Any exchange may be registered with the Commission as a national
securities exchange under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided
in this section, by filing a registration statement in such form as the
Commission may prescribe, containing the agreements, setting forth
the information, and accompanied by the documents below specified:

***
(2) Such data as to its organization, rules or procedure, and
membership . . .
(3) Dopies of its constitution, articles of incorporation with all amendments thereto, and of its existing bylaws or rules or instruments
corresponding thereto, whatever the name, which are hereinafter
collectively referred to as the "rules of the exchange; n •
/

***
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent any exchange
from adopting and enforcing any rule not inconsistent with this chapter
and the rules and regulations thereunder and the applicable laws of the
state in which it is located.
(d) If it appears to the Commission that the exchange applying for
registration is so organized as to be able to comply with the provisions
of this chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder and that the
rules of the exchange are just and adequate to insure fair dealing and
to protect investors, the Commission shall cause such exchange to be
registered as a national securities exchange.
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No . 72 - 312

Merrill Lynch v . Ware

Summer Memorandum
This is a brief memorandum, dictated after having
read most of the briefs .

It is entirely preliminary and,

in large degree superficial .

Further study is indicated.

State of the Case
Petitioner, a member of the N. Y. Stock Exchange, had
a profit sharing plan which provided that an employee who
voluntarily terminates employment and engages in competition
forfeits his vested interest in the plan .

Respondent

terminated his employment and went to work for a competing
broker .

He sued in the California state court, seeking his

accrued share of the profit sharing fund (all of which came
from contributions by the employer) .
The trial court, without opinion, held for respondent.
The California Court of Appeals affirmed, holding :

(i) that

the contract between petitioner and respondent was valid,
including the provision therein for arbitration; (ii) but that
the forfeiture provision of the profit sharing plan was an
unlawful restraint of trade violative of California Code

$ec . 16,600 and thus unenforcable; and (iii) also that
respondent's action was a suit for "wages " and thus could be
maintained under California Labor Code Sec . 229 without regard
to the arbitration agreement .

2.

Questions Presented
Although the questions presented on the briefs in this
Court do not, in all respects, conform to those addressed by the
California Court - and also in some respects the questions seem
confused and unclear - they may be summarized generally as follows :
(a)

whether California Sec . 229, as applied to the

arbitration agreement between a New York Stock Exchange member
and its employee, conflicts with - and is preempted by - Rule
347 (b) promulgated by the SEC under the Act of 1934 .
(b)

whether California Sec . 16,600 is, in effect,

preempted by Rule 347 (b) wk±KN of the N. Y.

wk±~kx

Stock Exchange -

wh i ch provides that any controversy between an employee and
member organization
( c)

11

shall be settled by arbitration" .

whether the application of California law to

an interstate brokerage firm burdens interstate commerce .
Discussion
The California Court held that the forfeiture
provision in the agreement was ineffective (void) under
California Sec . 16,600 as being a contract " in restraint of
trade ".

In view of this holding, it is not clear to me - at

least at this point in my study - why the Court reached the
second question as to arbitration .

But it went on to hold that

profit sharing benefits are "wages " under California law, and
that under California Sec . 229 disputes as to wages are not

3.
arbitrable .

I suppose we are bound by these interpretations

of California law .
This brings us to the question of " preemption 11
which is the

~x±mxx±x~

-

primary issue argued by the parties .

The Solicitor General (SG) in a memorandum amicus devotes
primary attention to the preemption issue .

He argues that

federal policy favoring arbitration, as reflected in Sec . 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, is not applicable as that
statute applies only to questions arising under collective
bargaining agreements - not to individual contracts .

But the

SG's brief does not address fully, or as specifically as I
would have hoped, the petitioner ' s position that Sec . 229
prohibiting abritration of wage disputes unless arbitration is
required by a collective bargaining agreement, conflicts with and is preempted by - Rule 347(b) of the New York Stock Exchange
which requires arbitration of employment disputes between
member firms and their employees .

This rule was promulgated

under Sec . 6 of the Act of 1934, and is in accord - it is
argued with a congressional policy of assuring order and
uniformity in the securities industry with respect to
employer/employee relationships .

Reliance is placed by

petitioner on Silver v . New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341 which I need to read more carefully .
I find nothing of substance in the Interstate Commerce
argument, but remain in considerable doubt as to the narrow

4.
preemption issue (as I understand it) relied on primarily by
petitioner.
Research by my Clerks
The appropriate law clerk should read the relevant
authorities and the briefs more carefully, with the view to
educating me as to the preemption issue.

The briefs of the

parties scatter their shots in so many directions, it is difficult
in a hurried reading to identify the possibly meritorious
positions from those that may be quite irrelevant .

Moreover,

although vast numbers of cases are cited, I have not found one
which even approaches being dispositive .
study is indicated .

In short, further

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Justice Powell

FROM:

John Jeffries

DATE:

October 3, 1973

No. 72-312, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
v. Ware, et al

The parties in this case have filed two long essays in the misuse
of authority. It may be helpful, therefore, to begin by sorting out
some of the issues that I consider irrelevant.
First, this case is not controlled by the United States Arbitration

--==-

Clause, 9 U.S. C.

§§

1 et seq. Petitioner contends that the statute

creates federal substantive law equally applicable in federal and
state courts. Despite the explicit dictum to that effect in Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 221 F. ed 482 (2nd Cir.
1959), it is not entirely clear that this is the law. The remedies
provisions in
Even if

§§

§§

3 and 4 are limited by terms to the federal courts.

1 and 2 are applicable in state courts, then provisions have

little impact on this case. Section 2 provides that argreements to
arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law and in equity for the revocation of any
contract." Thus the federal substantive policy favoring arbitration

2.

is dependent on the legality of the agreement under state law.
Furthermore, as respondent points out, it is at least arguable
that the exemption in

§

l reaches this employment contract ("nothing

herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce"). Some courts, however, have construed
this exception to encompass only workers engaged in the actual movement
of goods in interstate commerce. E.g.,

Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.

2d 7 83 (1st Cir. 1971). The opinion of this Court in Prima Paint v.
Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (endorsing the severability
doctrine as a matter of federal substantive law), is not applicable to
this case. That decision rested on

§

4 of the Act and was expressly

limited to the federal courts.
Second, this case does not implicate Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953). In Wilko an investor sued a securities brokerage firm in federal
court. The defendant invoked the U.S. Arbitration Act to compel
arbitration pursuant to an agreement signed by the customer. This
Court held waiver of the right to a judicial forum barred by
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.

§

77n:

"Any condition, stipulation, or prov1s10n
binding any person acquiring any security to waive
compliance with any provision of this subchapter
or of the rules and regulations of the Commission
shall be void. "

§

14 of the

3.

This case does not involve the 1933 Act, but respondent relies on
the parallel anti-waiver provision in§ 29(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78 cc(a):
"Any condition, stipulation, or prov1s10n
binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of and exchange required
thereby shall be void."
Respondent correctly points out that the 1934 anti-waiver provision,
unlike § 14 of the 1933 Act, is not limited to purchasers of securities.

-

Respondent, however, does not claim any substantive right under the
federal securities laws; he attacks the validity of his employment
contract under a California antitrust statute. Therefore, enforcement
of the arbitration agreement would not effect a waiver of compliance
with any securities statute, rule, or regulation. To my mind, § 29(a)
is by its terms inapplicable. And if § 19(a) does reach this case,
petitioner claims an exemption from its force under § 28(b) of the
Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78bb(b):
'~othing in this chapter shall be construed
to modify existing law (1) with regard to the binding
effect on any member of any exchange of any action
taken by the authorities of such exchange to settle
disputes between its members, or (2) with regard to
the binding effect of such action on any person who has
agreed to become bound thereby . . . . "

4.

Some courts have construed § 28(b) as exempting arbitration agreements from the anti-waiver rule of§ 29(a).

E.~.,

Brown v. Gilligan, Will

& Co., 287 F. Supp. 766 (S.D. N.Y. 1968). Respondent contends that

Brown is bad law and in any event inapplicable to this case because
concerned two member firms. It may be true that the policy behind Wilko
v. Swan is more nearly applicable to a dispute between a member firm and
an employee than to a dispute between two member firms, § 28(b) on its
face reaches "any person." If the question is whether an agreement to
arbitrate is an "action" within the meaning of the statute, ample
precedent calls for an affirmative answer. Brown, supra; Coenen v. R. W.
Pressprich & Co., 453 F. 2d 1209 (2nd Cir. 1972).
Third, respondent's argument concerning Article VIII, § 6 of the
NYSE constitution is irrelevant to this case. See pp. 13-14 of the brief,
Article VIII provides that any dispute between a member and a non-menber
must be submitted to arbitration "at the instance of such non-member."
Respondent apparently believes that Exchange Rule 347(b) is invalid
because it allows a member firm to compel arbitration in any dispute
with a registered representative. Whatever the merit of this claim
( and I am inclined to believe there is none), it is properly addressed
to the arbitrator, at least in the first instance.

5.

--

The case most nearly in point is Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S.
341 (19 63). In Silver this Court considered the accomodation of the 1934
Act with federal antitrust law. As Justice Goldberg phrased it, the
question was whether the exchange's duty of self-regulation was so
comprehensive as to constitute an implied repealer of the antitrust
laws. Of course, Silver does not control this case. The latter does
not involve the interface between competing federal statutes but
rather, as the parties sometimes seem to forget, a question of
federal preemption of state law. But analysis of this issue should be

/I

informed by reference to the reasoning of Silver.
The general scheme of exchange self-regulation is aptly described
in Silver:

\

"Thus arose the federally mandated duty
of self-policing by exchanges. Instead of giving
the Commission the power to curb specific instances
of abuse, the Act placed in the exchanges a duty to
register with the Commission, § 5, 15 U.S. C. § 78e,
and decreed that registration could not be granted
unless the exchange submitted copies of its rules,
§ 6 (a)(3), 15 U.S. C. § 78f (a)(3), and unless such
rules were "just and adequate to insure fair dealing
and to protect investors," § 6(d), 15 U.S. C. § 78f (d).
The general dimensions of the duty of self-regulation
are suggested by § l9(b) of the Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78s(b),
which gives the Commission power to order changes in
exchange rules respecting a number of subjects. . ..

6.
"One aspect of the statutorily imposed duty
of self-regulation is the obligation to formulate rules
governing the conduct of exc ange members. The
Act specifically requires that registration cannot be
granted "unless the rules of the exchange include
provision for expulsion, suspension, or disciplining
of a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent
with just and equitable principles of trade . . . . "
§6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f (b).
373 U.S., at 352-53.
As the guiding principle for reconciling this duty with the antitrust
laws, the Court announced that, "Repeal is to be implied only if
necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only
to the minimum extent nece·ssary." 373 U.S., at 357. The passage
quoted above identifies two normative criteria for exchange rules.
They should (1) "insure fair deal and . . . protect investors and
(2) discourage "conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade." An exchange rule fulfilling one of
these goals should have preemptive effect.
If you accept Silver as the appropriate framework for analysis

------

f)

of the preemption issue, the case boils down to this: .lit an exchange
rule requiring arbitration of any dispute which develops between a
member firm and its registered representative and which arises out of
the employment or termination of employment of that representative
"fall within the scope and purposes of the Securities Exchange Act"?

7.

Silver, 373 U.S. , at 361. In other words, is such a rule sufficiently
close to the core of the statutory duty of self-regulation that it
preempts the California statute guaranteeing a judicial forum?
The scant authority that exists suggests an affirmative answer. Rust v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 715 (S.D. N.Y. 1972); Dicksteinv.
DuPont, 413 F. 2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971). Neither of these cases, however,
is directly on point. Although I have not exhausted the opportunities
for research, I do not believe you will find substantial guidance in
the decisions of the lower courts. I might add that I think your
evaluation of the competing interests involved will be decidedly more
perceptive and sophisticated than anything I could come up with. The
exchange's interest in requiring arbitration of employment-related
disputes between members and their registered representatives does

-

-

not strike me as slight or trivial; nor do I believe it is essential to
the continued fulfillment of its statutory duty of self-regulation.
There is one point I would like to make. To my mind, }he
substance of the underlying dispute between these parties -- whether
the California antitrust statute invalidates the employment contract -i~

relevant to this case in its current posture. The issue is whether

the exchange rule requiring arbitration preempts the California statute
guaranteeing a judie ial forum. This question would be the same no
matter what the underlying dispute between the parties.
JCJjr

No. 72-312, Merrill Lynch v. Ware
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM RE DISPOSITION
Disposition along the following lines seems appropriate to me.

In light of the confusion below about the

relevant issues, this Court should identify the controlling
question, announce the appropriate standard for determination
of that question, and remand for reconsideration by the CaliforI

nia courts.

I

To my mind, the controlling issue is preemption,

- - - - - - - - --

---

l\

--

though as a prelude to that question, this Court should
determine the effect of the U.S. Arbitration Act in this
context.

The appropriate standard for deciding the preemption

-- ------- ------

question is derived from Silver. Of course, as you will see

----------------

from reading Silver, bare reference to that case does not
greatly illumine the issue, but I would take that case as the
starting point and developea test grounded in the relation of
any Exchange rule to the statutorily imposed duty of selfregulation.

This Court should state explicitly that the

California anti-trust law is only secondarily relevant to
the arbitration issue.

The remand would leave the parties

with a much narrower field of combat and give the lower courts
some guidance.
JCJjr
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

November 26, 1973

· Dear Harry:
Please join :roo in your opinion
in 72-312, Nerrill, Lynch v. Ware.

William

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc:

The;Conference

o.

Douglas

~u:prtmt <!j:lrud 1lf t4t 'Jtim±tlt ~t1:l-4£E
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Mr. Justice Powell c/"
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From : Blacknmn

UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA TE&:culated:
... "'"o. 72-312

Recirculated:

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner On Writ of Certiorari to
the Court of Appeal of
& Smith, Inc .. Petitioner,
'1) .
California, First AppelDavid Warr et al.
late District.
LDecembPr -. 1973J

MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents the question whether certain rules
of the New York Stock Exchange, promulgated as selfregulating measures pursuant to ~ 6 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. ~ 78f, and a broker's
employee's pledge to abide by those rules, pre-empt
avenues of wage relief otherwise available to the employee under state law. The California Court of Appeal
answered this in the negative. 24 Cal. App. 3d 35. 100
Cal. Rptr. 791 ( 1972). Because of the significance of
the question in the area of federal-state relations, we
grantPd certiorari. 410 U. S. 908 ( 1973) .
I
Respondent David Ware in July 1958 entered the
employ of petitioner Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner &
Smith. Inc., a New York corporation, as a registered
representative or "account executive" in the petitioner's
San Francisco office _ Ware worked there continuously
until March 1969 when he voluntarily terminated that
relationship and accepted a similar position in San Fran-·
cisco with one of Merrill Lynch 's competitors.
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Merrill Lynch is a broker-dealer in securities and is
a member-corporation of the New York Stock Exchange.
Since prior to 1958. the finn has had a noncontributory
Profit Sharing Plan for its employees in the United States.
P nder the Plan an employee may have allocated to his
account both vested and unvested units. as therein described. Article 11 of the Plan relates to "Forfeiture
of Benefits'' upon the happening of specified events.
Oue such event is competitive activity :
''11.1 A Participant who, in the determination
of the Committee. voluntarily terminates his employment with the Corporation or provokes his termination ami engages in an occupation which is,
w the determination of the Committee, competitive
with the Corporation, or any affiliate or subsidiary
thereof, shall forfeit all rights to any benefits otherwise due or to become due from the Trust Fund
with respect to units credited for fiscal years subsequent to the fiscal year ended December 30, 1960."
The Committee referred to is provided for by the Plan 's
Art. 1. It has not less than five nor more than nine
persons (not necessarily employees) appointed by Merrill
Lynch and serving "at the pleasure of the Corporation."
Article 1.2 states that the Committee "shall administer
the Plan" and "shall determine any questions arising in
the administration, interpretation and application of the
Plan , which determination shall be conclusive and binding on all persons '·'
At the time Ware terminated his employment with
Merrill Lynch in March 1969. both vested and unvested
units were allocated to his account. Upon his departure.
the Committee. pursuant to Art. 11.1 , determined that
Ware. by entering competitive employment, had forfeited
all rights to henefi ts due or t.o become due him Ullderthe Plan,
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ln January 1970 Ware filed this class action suit in
California state court against Merrill Lynch and the
members of the CommitteE-'. The class purported to consist of Ware and all other similarly situated former
Merrill Lynch employees in California. Declaratory relief was sought to the effect that Art. 11.1 was "unlawful
and void under applicable California law," and that the
defendants were obligated to pay all vested units credited
from December 30. 1960. ho the date of termination of
employment
Although the statute was not. cited in the complaint,
the parties appt(ar to agree that the suit rested principally on ~ 16600 of the California Business and Pro=fessions Code. This reads :
" Except as provided in this chapter. every contract
by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a
lawful profession. trade, or business of any kind is to
that extent void ,'

l11 its answer, Mernll Lynch alleged that the provisiOns of Art. 11.1 were a reasonable restraint on competition under the laws of New York or of the United
States; that, pursuant to Art. 22.1' of the Plan. it was
to be construed according to the Jaws of New York;
that under "\lew York law Art. 11.1 is lawful. valid, and
enforceable ; that a condition of Ware's employment with
Merrill Lynch was approval by the New York Stock
Exchange; that Ware. at the time of his employment
in 19.18, executed a written application. on an Exchange
form, for approval of his employment as a registered
representativf' , as requiretl by the Exchange's Rule
f. '"22 l
Thr vabdtty of th(' Plan or oi i.ll1.)' or thP provi~ions thrreol'
,.;hall bf' drtermined undrr and ~hall br ron~trued arcordjng to the
htw~ of thP Stat<> of New York ··
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(a l ( 1) ; " that by 11 30 ( J) of that form Ware agreed
that any controversy with a member arising out of the
termination of his employment shall be settled by arbitration at the instance of ally party; " that the Exchange
approved the application; that Ware's sole remedy was
arbitration; and that a declaration that Art. 11.1 was
in valid under the laws of California would cause Merrill
Lynch to discriminate in the achmmstration of the Plan
and would deprive it of clue process of law
Hnlt~ 345 . (a) Xo mrmbrr or mrmbrr organization ~hall
· ( l J pe>rmtt any prro<on to JWrform rrgula rly thr duties customanly prrformed b~· <I regt~trrrd rPJll'PHrntntive. nnle~s :such per:son
,;hall have regt:,;trrrd wttb nnd 1" aecPptnble to the Exchange.
~ Paragraph :30 (.J) of tlw Exchange form read~.
' (,J) l agree that an~- controver~y betwr(•ll me and any
member organizat wn amilng out of my employmrnt or the termination of m~· employnwnt h~- and with such .. member orgamzation Hhall bC' ~rttled by arbitration at the mstance of any such party
in accordance with the Con~t1tutwn and rulr::; then obtammg of the
New York Stock Exchange. "
Paragraph :30 (d) of ilw ,;a rn(• form rrad:,; :
'(d) I have rrad the Con~tttutton and Hules of the Board of
Governors of the Nrw York Stock Exchange and, tf approved, 1
hereby pledge m~·sp[f to abidr b\' thr Con~titution and Rules of thr
Board of Govemor::; of the l\'rw York Stock Exchange as the same
ha vr brrn or "hall br from t ImP to t imr amrnded, and by all mles
and regulation.- adoptPd pur:,;w1nt to thr ConstitutiOn , and by all
practtcrs of tlw Exehangt> .'
Rule :H7 (b) of thP Nrw York Stock Exchange, adoptt>d in April
Hl5R. pnor to Wa rr '~ employment, providr~ .
" (b) Any cont rovrr~y bt>twPrn a regt8t ered represpntativP and
any .
. member orgamzatiOn ansmg out of the employment or
terrnmatton of rmployment of Hnch rcgi"tcred rcpre.~entativc by and
w1th such .. mr mbrr orgamzatwn ;;hall lJC' srttlrd by arbitration,
at the mstance of any wch part~· . m accordancr with the urbitation
wocrdurr prescribed rbewlwre in th('se niles. ··
2 •

,!

It IS thns apparrnt that :~0 (.1) of tlw form
o f the Exchange 's Rule 347 (hl .

follow~

the langnaf!;e·

'

.

72-312-0PTNION

MERRILL LYNC'H, PIERCE, FENNER & Sl'vilTH v. WARE

5

Merrill Lynch. invoking~ 1281.2 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure,' petitioned the state court for an
order directing arbitration pursuant to the above quoted
f[ 30 (.J) and Ware's pledge , contained in his application
for approval of employment, that he would "abide by
the Constitution and Rules of the Board of Governors of
the New York Stock Exchange" and that he submitted
himself "to the jurisdiction of such Exchange."
Ware opposed arbitration on tho grounds that no contract to arbitrate existed between him and Merrill Lynch,
t.hat if an agreement to this effect existed, it was a contract of adhesion; and that, since ~ 16600 made the forfeiture provision illegal under Californina law. it was not
arbitrable.
The state tnal court. by mmute order, denied the
petition to compel arbitration.
Merrill Lynch then appealed. The California Court
of Appeal held that a written agreement to arbitrate
did exist; that the Exchange form was "a contractual
agreement''; and that the "approval and registration by
Merrill Lynch made the application a contract between
the parties." 24 Cal. App. 3d, at 40-41. 100 Cal. Rptr.,
at 795- 796 The court went on to hold, however, that
the forfeiture clause was invalid and unenforceable under
California law, when applied to California residents, as
1

"§ 12111.2 Ordrr to arbttrate

rontrovrr;:;~ · ,

pehtton, drtrrmina-

t ion of court.
'Ou p!'tthon ol a party to nn <trbllratwn agrcrmrnt alleging thr
!'XJ~tenrr

of a wnttrn al!:rcemrnt to arbttratr a controvrr~y and that
rrfu~<'~ to arbttrntr such controver;:;~·. thr court ~ha ll
ordC'l' thr JWtltwner and tlw rr~ponclrnt to arbJtrntr thr controversy
it It clrtermmco. that an agrrrmPut to arbitratr the eontrovrrsy
PXJ~t~. uillr::;s it determine::; that :
' (a) Tlw nght. to comprl arhJtrattOII has b!'en wmved by the
Jlf'tll!OIIer , Ul
· 1h) Ground~". ext;;! for th<· n·vocHtJOn of 1 hr agrrrmPnt

a party thrreto

,,
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bemg m rcstra1nt of trade. U Cal. App. 3d, at 42-43.
100 Cal. Ilptr .. at 796- 797. Cited as supporting authoritit's WE're Prame Y. Merrill Lynch , Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
fnt .. 20 Cal. App. 3d 668. 97 C'al. Rptr. 811 ( 1971), where
the salll(' forfeiture claust' was held ineffective under
California law. but wherE' the court also held that an
t'nforceable agreement to arbitrate existed,'; and Muggill
' Re·ube11 H Dmmelley Corp ., 62 Cal. 2cl 230. 3~)8 P. 2d
147 !1H65J
Finally, the Court of Appeal, while taking note of
( 'alifornia's "strong public policy" favoring arbitration.
held that lVIC'rnll Lynch 's co11tributions under its Profit
' l11 Fmme. dPclclNl on!~· hv<' moilth;:, rarllN . tlw ~anw Cahforma
ourt of AppPal reversed a trw! <·ourt '~ orde-r deuywg arbitration
a nd thu ~ "l'<' mJngl~ · a!TlvPd ;d an ult1matr rp;;ult oppo::nte that
rrarlwd 1n thr prr,;ent ea~P. Thr court hrld, 20 Cal. App. 3d, at
(j/J -()7:~. 97 Cal. HPptr., at Kl:~-kl5, that Framr (hkP Warr) had
madr an agrr<>rnl'nt to arb1tratC'; that then• wn s no ba~1s for u~mg
tlw doctnnr ol adhr::non to avOid arbJtr;ttion, that the forfr1tnrP
provlHIOil of Art . 11.1 wa::; mrtl'ectlvC' undrr § HiGOO ; that the agrermrnt\ pron~1011 that Nc•w York Jaw was to apply "must not bP
nllowl'd to drfeat '' thl' pohr.1· of§ lfi()QO, that , howc>vrr, the rntJrr
contract wa:- not nrcc·ssa nly unlawful ; and that a
~

'la tc>nt !Jll<'i<tiOll <'XIHt;; a~ to wlwtlwr tlw a~?:rt'l'nlPtlls of the partieA
<'on:-;t ruc·d a:; n pplymg only to ~uch Jll'rml~~~ble ~ ubject s of
r!•,.;t rautt a;; hn•a clw" of ronfidrncr and rm ~a pproprwtwn of trade
~l'l'n' t"
Oth<·r qut'::;twn~ ma~· be· ra1,.;rd n" to th r tunr and cJrcum"tanc·l·~ ol rP"]HJllclPnt ~ rmplo~·m('nt and. the amount of any benefits
•·arnrd and r<·rrwlnmg unpatd . All of tiWHC' mattrrH , whethrr thry
tnvolvl' qur"t1on" of law or qur::; twn ~ of fact an• m thr fir::;t mstancP
proprrly tillh.wct to arhttratron ." 20 Cal. App. :~ct, at fi7a, 97 Cal.
H pt r , at ,.., 15
ma.\ IJ('

But no nH•ntrorl wa" made m Frame of§§ :.ZOO and 229 of thr 8tatr '::;
Labor Cod<', :-l'l' n d, mfra, and, as tlw court latrr ~:ud m
Warl', 14 C'nl Ap p. :~d. at 4:~. 100 Cal. Hptr. , at 797, " [t]hc Frame
eourt dul not t•on~rder th<· pffP<·t ol ~<·c'tlOII ~:29 of thP Labor Code on
th<· arlHtr;ttJOn Hgn•c·mpnt." Apparrntly, nr1thrr ::;idr 111 Frame
"n11ght. rr·vrPw by tlw Ca lifornia Suprrrnr C'ourt

'

.
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~haring Plan were wages. within the meaning of ~~ 200"
and 229 7 of the California Labor Code, and that ~ 229
gave Ware "the right to bring his claim in court in spite
of any agreement to arbitrate." 24 Cal. App. 3d, at 43~
44. 100 Cal. Rptr .. at 797-798. Merrill Lynch's petition
for hearing by the Supreme Court of ( 'alifornia was de~
11ied without opinion ~ee 24 Cal. App. 3d. at 45

1r
The broad issue thus presented to us is the extent to
\\·hich authority delegated under a federal regulatory
statute pre-empts state law. ~pecifically, we are con~
err ned with the questions (a) whether. in the context. of
the present case, ~ 229 of the California Labor Code,
which would preclude compulsory arbitration of wage
disputes. is i11effective under the ~upremacy Clause;
(b) whether ~ 16600 of the California Business and Professions Code unduly in tcrferes with federal regulation
of the securities industry; and (c) whether th<" C'aliforma legislation unconstitutionally burdens interstate
comnwreP
'· ·§ 200 Delimtlon~
' A,.. u~ed 111 tlu~ nrt1elP: \11) · wage~ lllrlucl('~ all amount for labor
pPrfortnl'U by employl'l'~ of PvPr~· de:srnpt10n, whethPr tlw amount
~~ fixPd or a,;cNt<llllPd b~· the ~tamlard of tlmr, ta:;k, Jl!CCl', eornnus~ion ba:;J:;, or otlwr mrthocl of ralculat 1011 '
· '§ 229. Act10n~ to pnforeP paymPnt of wagP:>: pffprf of arbi' rat 1011 agrPrtn('llt,..
ActiOns to cnforcp tlw prOYIIiiOll,; of th1:; Mtiele lor the rollect10n
ol dul• and unpaid wage:; rlanned b~ · an uHhvidual ma~· lw mmntallt('d without rrgard to tlw l'X1Mtl'l1CP of any pnvatr agreement to
arb1tratc. Th1s ~<'CtiOtl :-dudl not apply to claim~ mvolvmg any
dll-ipute conerrnmg the mterprPtatJOH or applicatiOn of an~· rollectJVP
hargammg agreNnPtlt ront<tllllll).!; :;uch an arb1tratwn agreement '·'
S<'l'tlon 229 wa~ add<'d to tlw Cod<· 111 19.')9 . Cnl Stnts. 1959,
' · t\.J:m . p 4.5:t~ .
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i"haring Plan were wages. within the meaning of ~~ 200"
and 229 ' of th(' California Labor Cod(', and that ~ 229
gave Ware "the right to bring his claim in court in spite
of any agreement to arbitrate." 24 Cal. App. 3d, at 43~
44, 100 Cal. Rptr., at 7~)7-7~!8. Merrill Lynch's petition
for hearing by the Supreme Court of California was de~
nied without opiuion ~<'e 24 Cal. App. :~d. at 45
1r
The broad issue thus presented to us is the ext<'nt to
which authority delegated under a federal regulatory
statute pre-empts state law. ~pecifically, we are con
cerned with the questions (a) whether, in tho conte-xt of
the present case, ~ 229 of the California Labor Code,
which would preclud(' compulsory arbitration of wage
disputes. is ineffective under the Supremacy Clause;
(b) whether ~ 16600 of the California Business and Professwns Code unduly interferes with federal regulation
of the securities industry; and (c) whether the Callforma legislation unconstitutionally burdf'ns interstate
commereP
4

'• '§ 1()()

l)('fillltlOll~

A,. u~ed 111 tlu~ arti("IP: (a J ·Wagp,.; uJCiud(•:-; all amount for labor
JWrfunnPd by emplo~·pp::; of PV<'f~· dP:srnptwn, whPtlwr th(' amount
1~ fixt>d or a:-;cNtnmPd b~· tlw ,.;tandard of ttntP, ta::<k, ]Her<·. <·ornmts~ion ba:s1:s, or otiH'r mPthod of ralrulatwn '
· '§ 229 . Act ton ~ to rnfore<· payrnrnt of wagP;; . pffrrt of arbi1 rat 1011 agrPrm!'Ill""
Actton,.; to cnl'ore(· tlw provi:,;JOn~ of tht;; arttrlr lor the collertwu
of dnP aud uupaid wage~ rlamwd IJ_,. an IIIdtvidual may be mamiaul('d wtthout rPgnrd to tlw <'Xt~t<·ll('l' of any pnvatP agreement tu
nrbit rate . Thiii ~<·rt 1011 iihall not appl~· to claun~ 111volvlllg any
di~JlUI!:' concrrnmg the tntcrprPiatJOII or application of an~· eolll'rttvr
bargammg all:l'PPmPnt rontam111g :-;ueh an arbttratwn agreement
8P(·ttou 129 wa~ nddPd to tlH• C'odP Ill 19.19 . Cal Stat:-; 1959,
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In order to resolve these questiOns, we think it necessary to review the principles of stock exchange pre<'mption delineated in this Court's decision a decade ago
Ill

Silver \' , :\'ew York Stock Exchange, 373

e.

H. 341

n 963).

and to examine thr geneses of the federal Act
and of the California statu t<•
A. In 81:lver thE' Court considered whether. and Lo what
(•xtent. the federal antitrust laws apply to secunties ex·
changes regulated by the 1934 Act. lt held that the
mere passage of the Act did not effect. pro tanto, a repeal
of the federal antitrust laws. but that particular instances
of exchange regulation that fall within the scope and
purposes of the Act may be 1ustified and will be upheld
against antitrust challenge. ld .. at 357- 361. vYith respect to thr specific question therr pre sen ted. it was clear
that the 0: ew York ~tock Exchange had exercised its
" tremendous economic pov.:rr." id., at 361. against two
nonnwmbers by discontinuing their direct wire-telephone
connections with members of the Exchange without
notice , !waring, or statement of reasons. lt was the
Court's view. under thr Circumstances, that procedural
guarantees \vere necessary in order to protrct against
1e poss1 11ty o antitrust practices and to provide the
·'f'xtremely beneficial f'ffrct in kreping exchange actwn
from straying wto areas wholly foreign to the purposes
of the Securities Exchange Act. " 1d. , at 362. See also.

Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U . S. 2g9,
ao0-301 ( 19n J
1n contrast with Silver, we are not confronted here
with conflicting ff'deral regulatory schemes. ThE' present
eon troversy concerns the interrelationship between statutes adopted. respectively, by the Federal Govemmcnt
and a ~tate. The analytical framework of Silver IS
111structive. nonetheless. There the Court reviewed
carefully the regulatory S<'curities exchange scheme that
Congress had adopted in order to identlfy the character
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and purposes of the Act and the extent to which instances
of exchange self-regulation were necessary to the furtherance of congressional aims and objectives. 373 U. S., at
349-361. It was mindful, al o, of the purposes behind
the conflicting statutes which, in that case, were the
antitrust laws. So here, we may not overlook the body
of law relating to the sensitive interrelationship between
statutes adopted by the srparatc. yet coordinate, federal
and state sovereignties. Our analysis is also to be tempered by the conviction that the proper approach is to
reconcile "the operation of both statutory schemes with
onr another rather than holding one completely ousted."
ld. , at 357.' The principle that emerged from Silver,
and the premise upon which the Court based its judgment, was that conflicting law, absent repealing or exclusivity provisions, should be pre-empted by exchange selfregulation "only to the extent 11ecessary to protect the
achievement of the aims of the Securities Exchange Act."
fd., at 361.
B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
15 l '. ::-1. C'. ~~ 78a to 78hh- l, "regulates securities markets and the business of securities brokers and dealers.' '
Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. H. R. Doc. No. 95,
Pt. 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. , 3 (1963) . Two types of
regulation are reflected i11 the Act. ~ome provisions
tmpose direct requirements and 1)rohibitions. Among
these arr mandatory exchange registration, restrictions
on broker and dealer borrowing , and the prohibition of
mani pu lati ve or deceptive prartices. Other provisious
~This npproach ~ ~ Hupportl'd b)· dPciHIOllH cxtcndmg back to the
turn of tlw century . Flonda Lzme & Auocado Growers, Int . v. Paul,
37:3 P . 8. 1:32 , 14:2 (196:3); Huron Portland Cemeut ('o . v. City of
Detroit, :35:2 ll. S. 440 (l9fi0); /uter11atwnal Assn. of Machimsts v
Oouza/ei:i. :356 U.S. 617 (l!:l5X) ; l 'mo11 Brukeraue Cu., .. Jeusen, a:Z:!
!'. S. 202. (l944) ; Savaol' v. Jo11e~ , :225 (1 S. 50l (1912) .
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are flexible and rely on the techmque of self-regulation
to achieve their obJectives. Ibid. Supervised selfregulation, although consonant with the traditional private governance of exchanges, allows the Government to
monitor exchange busmess in the public mterest.n MR.
JusTICE DouGLAS, when he was Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, observed that this permits the exchanges to "take the leadership with Government playing a residual role. Government would keep
the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well
oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would
never have to be used. " vV. Douglas, Democracy and
Finance (Allen Ed. 1940) 82.
The Act provides for stock exchanges to be registered
by the Commission. ~ 6, 15 U. S. C.
78f. It outlaws securities transactions conducted on unregistered
exchanges. ~ 5. 15 U. S. C. 78e. It conditions regtstration on a showing that the exchange has rules
that are "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and
to protect investors.' ' ~ 6 (d). 15 U. S. C. ~ 78f (d).

s

s

The fir~t at tempt at exchange regulatiOn arose after I he panic
of 1907 when, in respon~e to puhhe concrrn over speculation, President Theodore Hoo~evelt uq1;rcl Congre~~ to take action. 42 Cong.
Hec. 1:H7, 1:349 (1908). Nothing of ~ignificancc happened, however ,
until after the 1929 stock markN crash. It brcame apparent that
'' transactions m :::eeu nti e::: a,; commonly conducted upon securities
rxchanges and ovcr-the-countPr market:; arp al'frctpd With a natiOnal
public mtrrest which makt'~ it neces~a r~· to providP for regulation
and control of such tmn~actwns and of practices and of matters
related therPto." SrcuritJes Exchange Aet of 1934, § 2. 15 U. S. C .
§ 78b. Self-rrgulat10n was adopted HS a mean~ of pohcmg the
rxchanges TI1e tra(litJOn, as has brrn notre!, had been one of sclfgovernanee; thr financial community wa:-; stro ng!~· opposrd to govrrnmrntal control of dail~· exchange bu~mes;;; nnd the ta;;k wao;
dremrd to br of such magmtudr that Govrrnmmt ~imply rould not
regulate rffectively evrr~· n~prct of tbr mdu~try. Comment, 48
l\1um. L, Rev., 597-598 (19G4) , L Lm<~>, Sreunt)('::; Rrgulatwn, Vol ,
'2, pp 1175-117() (l9(il ), and Vol 5, pp :H38-:H:39 (1969)
9

72-312-0PI.NION
"\IEHHILL LYNCH. PlERCE, FENNER & SMITH v. WARE

11

An E'xchange sE'eking registratwn must also meet other
requirements. It must agree "to enforce so far as is
within its powers compliance by its membE'rs" with the
Act and the Corn mission's rules and regulations thereunder. ~ 6 (a)(1), 15 U. S. C. § 78f (a)(1). It must
mclude in its rules a provision for the disciplining
of a member ''for conduct or proceeding inconsistent
with JUSt and equitable principles of tradE'." ~ 6 (b) ,
15 11 . S.C. § 78f (b). And it must supply to the Commisswn copies of its constitution, articles of incorporatwn, and bylaws, and such data or other information as
the Commission may require "as being necessary or
appropriate in thE' public interest or for the protection
of investors.'' ~ 6 (a)(3) and (2). 15 U. 8. C. § 78f (a)
(3) and (2) .
The Commisswn 's d1rect authonty With respect to
exchan e self-regulation IS supervisory. Apart from 1ts
-----------,.,.----c::re=-:s:::p:-:o:-:n:-:s~ib;:_-I~
·~ ies in registering exchanges, thE' Commission
may "alter or supplement'' the rules of an exchange if
such action 1s ''necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors or to msure fair dealing in securities
traded m upon such exchange or to msure fair administration of such exchange." ~ 19 (b), 15 U. S. C.
~ 78s (b).'"
This authority, however, relates to 12
designated subject areas and "similar matters." Ibid.
As a consequence, some exchange rules are not subject
to direct Commission scrutiny, In re Rules of the New
York Stock Exchange, 10 S. E. C. 270, 294 ( 1941), and,
instead, if they do not operate contrary to the interests
of msuring fair dPaling and protecting investors, would
kindle no fPderal curiosity and would serve no identifi-'
1

The Commt;:;swn abo ha;. broad rule-makmg power under the
8rr, for cxampiP, §§ K, 9, an<l 11, 15 ll S. C §§ 7Sh, 7Ri, and
No qur~tion ~ ~ pre:;entrd 111 tim; Ci!H(' a~ to thr authority or
1 ~~~ to rromnlgatr mle~ atff'rtmg thr oprrat10n of ::;tack
ex<"haHgr'i-,
"

Al'i
71-lk
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able public purpose. 1t is to be noted, moreover, that
the Commission has exercised its direct supervisory power
sparingly . Securities Industry Study, Report of the
Subcommittee on Securities, Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, S. Doc. No. 93-13, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 180 ( 1973)
Apart from registration and direct Commisswn supervision, the only other qualification on exchange autonomy
is the statutory requirement that any rules promulgated
and enforced by an exchange not be "inconsistent with
this [Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder and
the applicable laws of the State in which it is located.''
~ 6 (c), 15 U.S. C. ~ 78f (c)
From this review of relevant portiOns of the Act, it
ts apparent that Congress accorded maximum scope to
self-regulation, and reposed powers in the Commission
"to be exercised as needed but in such manner as to allow
maximum initiative and responsibility to the selfregulators." Report of the Special Study, supra, Pts.
4-6, at 726. In the words of the Senate Report issued
at the time of enactment.
"Thus the initiative and responsibility for promulgating regulations pertaining to the administration
of their ordinary affairs remain with the exchanges
themselves. It is only where they fail adequately
to provide protection to investors that the Commission is authorized to step in and compel them to do
so." S. Rep. No. 792. 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13
(1934)

It 1s thus clear that the congressiOnal aim 111 supervised self -regulation is to insure fair dealing and to protect investors from harmful or unfair trading practices.
To the extent that any exchange rule or practice contravenes this policy, or any authorized rule or regulation
under thP Act, the rulp may be subject to appropriate

72-312-0PINION
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federal regulatory supervision or action. Correspondingly, any rule or practice not germane to fair dealing
or investor protection would not appear to fall under the
shadow of the federal umbrella; it is, instead. subject to
applicable state law.
C. On the other side are the Califorma statutes. By
the addition of ~ 229 to its Labor Code in 1959 Califomia
codified for the wage earner, with the solitary collective
bargaining agreement exception. a right of action to
recover clue and unpaid wages from his employer, regardless of the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate Selected 1959 Code Legislation, 34 C'al. St. B. J.
581, 706-707. This was due, apparently, to the legislature's desire to protect the worker from the exploitative
employer who would demand that a prospective employee
sign away in advance his rigl1t to resort to the judicial
system for redress of an employment grievance. The
statute's legislative history is sparse, but the exception
carved out for collective bargaining disputes provides the
obvious conclusion that it was the individual. nonunion
and otherwise unprotected wage earner who was the
intended beneficiary of the State's grace in providing this
remedy. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that
§ 200 (a) of the Code defines "wages" broadly to inc] ucle
"all amounts for labor performed by employees of every
description, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained
by the standard of time, task, place. commission, basis,
or other method of calculation. ' ' And the C'aliforma
court itself has noted "the established policy . . . of protecting and promoting" the right, " 'favored' in the law/'
of the wage earner "to all wages lawfully accrued to
him." City of Ukiah v. Fones, 64 Cal. 2cl 104, 108, 410
P. 2d 369 . 371 ( 1066). It may be, too, that the legislature felt that arbitration was a less than adequate protection against awarding the wage earner something short
of what was due comp('nsation . I 11 any event, there is
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the harder substance of C'aliforuia case law. In Local
659 v. Color· Corp. of America, 47 Cal. 2cl 189, 302 P. 294
(1956). decided prior to the addition of ~ 229 to the
Labor Code. the court held that the then ~ 1280 of the
State's Code of Civil Procedure, providing for the
euforcement of an arbitration clause iu a contract and
characterizing it as "irrevocable," was subject to waiver
or mutual rescission. The statute provided that arbitratiou was required "save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 11
California, thus, does not exclude a remedy available at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract that
happens to contain an arbitration clause.
This conclusion as to the broad and liberal intendment
of ~ 229 is reinforced by the Court of Appeal's observation in the present case. 24 Cal. App. 3d. at 44- 45. 100
Cal. Rptr., at 798, that the State's Arbitration Act,
revised in 1961, embraced no attempt to change the right
of action first accorded the wage earner only two years
rarlier in 1959. The record is clear, moreover, that legislative attention was drawn in 1961 to ~ 229. The California Senate was asked to reconsider its unanimous vote
in favor of the Arbitration Act on the ground that there
was legislative uncertainty as to its effect upon ~ 229.
2 Journal of the Senate 2215-2218 (May 4, 1961). The
motion to reconsider was later waived, and the bill was
transmitted to the Assembly. !d., at 2287 (May 8,
1961). Thus, the Senate hac! in mind the rights accorded
wage earners by ~ 229, and those rights were placed in
focus with the "historic friendliness of California to the
institution of arbitration." E. Feldman , Arbitration
Modernization-The New California Arbitration Act, 34
11 SE'ctwn 1280 wn~ rep0a l('c[ and f('p]nrC'd 111 l\J60 to mak(' tht'
1>:1vmg clau~C' now !'('fld, "~av(' upon ~ueh grounds as rxis1 for the
revoc<ttwn of any contract" Cal. Stat::;. 1961 , r 461 , pp . 1541- 1542,,
~§ J all(( 2.
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So. Calif. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1961). Section 229 thus survived subsequent legislative scrutiny and has now mani~----r----:f21 sted itself as an important state policy through interpretation by the California courts.
One might also consider, as the respondent suggests
here, the California antitrust policies embodied in ~ 16600
of the Business and Corporation Code, quoted, ante,
p. - . This statute has been in effect for many years
and is well entrenched in case law and in commentary. 12
We need not pursue in depth the policy considerations
supporting this statute because, in our judgmeut, § 16600,
standing alone and apart from ~ 229, under existing case
law, would not provide the necessary support to uphold
a challenge to arbitration. Our inclination in this respect is buttressed by the different results reached by
the California Court of Appeal in this case and in Prame,
supra, respectively. In Frame, the court decided that
the "strong California public policy" against restraining
one from engaging in a lawful business foreclosed the application of the more permissive New York law to the
forfeiture provision of the profit-sharing plan. Although
California public policy thus served to nullify the contract's forfeiture provision, arbitration, nonetheless, was
not @~. By way of contrast, the present case
])fOvoked a claim under § 229, in addition to Ware's
reliance on § 16600, in the face of Morrill Lynch's motion to compel arbitration. The California court declared
again that the forfeiture clause was invalid but, in addition, held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable,
relying ou ~ 16600 and ~ 229, respectively. With this
analysis of the state statutes made by the California
court, we rest on that court's interpretation of state law
and do not, and in fact cannot, disturb its determination
12

Sec citation~ followmg § 16600 m We~t'~ Ann. Cahf. Bus. &

Prof. Codr, p 41, et

~e q .
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that under those statutes arbitration will lie in the one
mstance but not in the other.
With this background, we turn to specific arguments
atl.vanced by the petitioner here.

TII
A. Merrill Lynch suggests that Rule 347 (b) of the
New York Stock Exchange, set forth in n. 3, supra,
falls under the Exchange's mandate to protect the investing public and to insure just and equitable trade
practices.'" Its contention is that confidence in the industry and in the integrity and ability of its members
has been Jeopardized by failures of major brokerage
houses with consequent substa11tial losses to the public.
lnvestor confidence would be further undermined, it
IS said, by protracted litigation between member firms
and their employees over disputes that arise out of employment relationships; public airing of every claim
of this kind will erode confidence in the market; and
arbitration, on the other hand, will internalize these
disputes and provide an expeditious and economical
method of resolution by arbitrators familiar with industry customs and practices.
As is seen by our discussion above.~~ 6 (d) and 19 (b)
of the Act, 15 U. S. C. ~ ~ 78f (d) and 78s (b), establish
the measure of congressionally delegated authority for
self-regulation in the national interest. Section 6 (d)
requires that exchange rules be "just and adequate to
Tlw phrase "ju;;t and equttablr trade practir('~" does not have
its vrrb11tim counterpart in the :;tatutr. It would be inappropriately
used to Justify Rule :347 (b). Th1~ is b<:>cau~c· thr sta ndard r<:>fer~ to
rul<:>~ adopt<:>d pursuant to §f) (b) of tlw Art, 15 U.S. C. §78f (b),
provtdmg for th<:> C'xpul ~ ton, l:iUSJ)('l1l:iJOn or disciplining of a memb0r
''fo r conduct or preceeding inconsistent wtth JUi:it and equitable pnnrtpl<'s of trade ." Arbitration ts not the type of disci plinary rulC'
thnt § 6 (b) contrmplate~ .
13
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insure fair dealing and to protect investors." Section
19 (b) gives the Commission limited power over certain
types of exchange rules "for the protection of investors
or to insure fair dealing in securities" or to "insure fair
administration" of the exchanges. 11 Measured by these
standards, we conclude that the policy arguments advanced by Merrill Lynch do not requirP pre-emption of
contrary state law by Rule 347 (b).
To begin with the obvious, there is nothing in the Act
and there is no Commission rule or regulation that specifies arbitration as the favored means of resolving
employer-employee disputes.'' It is also clear that Rule
347 (b) would not be subject to the Commission's modification or review under ~ 19 (b). The United States,
as amicus, concedes as much, and we conclude, as the
Government suggests, that the relationship between compulsory employer-employee arbitratio11 and fair dealing
and investor protection is "extremely attenuated and
peripheral, if it exists at all.'' Brief for the United
A~ noted above, ante, p. --, the Commi~~Ion's review power
over exrhan!!;e rule~ i~ circumscribed b~· certain ~ubJect matter limitations explicitly enumerated in § 19 (b). ~one of the ~ub]ect
matter catrgor1es sugge~t~ that thr Commi~~ion has review authority
with re~pcct to :1 rule reqUiring arbitration of employer-employee
disputes.
'"This Court and other fedrral courts, of com~P. have endorsed
the ~mtability of arbitration to rE'solve federally created rights.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 lJ . S. 427, 431 (195:3); C'oenPn v. R. W. Pressprich & Co., 45:3 F. :2d 1:209 (CA2 1972), rert. drnird, 406 U.S. 949
(1972). Srr other r:tse:; ritPd by :\IR . .JusTICE WHITE in Jus dissentmg opinion in U. 8. Bulk Camers, Inc. v. Arg·uelles, 400 U.S. 351,
:374-:n5 (1971). ThPSP case~. however, conrrrn sit uationti where a
fpcleral act Ilt>rlf ha~ provided for arbitratJOn. Yet 111 Wilko v .
.Swan an investor ru~tomrr'ti agreement to arb1tntte wm; held vmd
undN § 14 of the Securitirs Act of 19:3:3, 15 U.S. C.§ 77n, notwith~tanding thr provision~ of§ :3 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S. C. § ·:3.
Ser PPrma Paint Corp \'. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., :388 U S. 395
( 1967).
14
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States 9. Merrill Lynch has not alleged that arbitration
will effect fair dealing or result in investor protection.
l t suggests only that investor confidence not be shaken
further by public airing of employer-employee disputes;
There is no explanation of why a judicial proceeding,
even though public, would undermine investor confidence.
It is difficult to understand why muffling a grievance in
the cloakroom of arbitration would prevent lessening of
confidence in the market. To the contrary, for the generally sophi~ticated investing public, market confidence
may tend to be restored in the light of impartial public
court adjudication. Furthermore, it should be apparent
that, so far as investor confidence is concerned , compulsory arbitration of a labor dispute is no substitute
for direct effective disciplinary action against any abusive
exchange practice. Other rules of the exchange serve
this very function. Rule 345 (b), for example, permits
the exchange to disapprove, and thereby to forestall, the
employment of any person, and Rule 345 (c) spells out
punitive measures for "conduct inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade," or "acts detrimental to
the interest or welfare of the Exchange," or "conduct
contrary to an established practice of the Exchange."
These measures, designed to insure fair dealing and to.
protect investors, are of the kind directly related to the
Act's purposes and ordinarily would not be expected to
yield to provisions of state law.
B. Rule 347 (b) cannot be categorized, as the petitioner suggests, as part of a need for uniform national
regulation. There is no revelation in the Act or in any
Commission rule or regulation that nation-wide U11iformity of an exchange's housekeeping affairs is necessary or desirable. And Merrill Lynch has not demonstrated that national uniformity in the area of wage .
claims is vital, in some way, to federal securities policy ..
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Convenience in exchange management may be desirable,
but it does not support a plea for uniform application
when the rule to be applied is not necessary for the
acievement of the national policy objectives reflected in
the Act. Indeed , Congress, in the securities field, has
not adopted a regulation system wholly apart from and
exclusive of state regulation. Cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp ., 331 U. S. 218, 234-236 ( 1D47); Campbell
\ . Hussey, 368 U.S. 297,302 (1961). Instead, Congress
intended to subject the exchanges to state regulation
that is not inconsistent with the federal act. Section
6 (c) , 15 U. S. C . ~ 78f (c) , explicitly subjects exchange
rules to a requirement of consistency with the Act "and
the applicable laws of the State in which it is located. "
''Where the Government has provided for collaboration
the courts should not find conflict.'' Union Brokerage
Co . v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202, 20!1 ( 1944). And we observed in Silver that the scheme of self-regulation provides in some cases for no agency check on exchange
behavior and, therefore, "[s]ome form of revtew of exchange self-policing, whether by administrative agency
or by the courts, is . . . not at all incompatible with
the fulfillment of the aims of the Securities Exchange
Act." 373 U. ~- . at 351:!.
C. It is also argued that the applicable state laws
referred to in ~ 6 (c) are the laws of the State in whJCh
the exchange itself is located. Thus, because the New
York Stock Exchange is in the City of New York, tt
is said that ''the applicable laws '' are those of New York,
and that the California court was in error m not applying
New York law that would have compelled arbitration
of thts dispute and would have validated the forfeiture
provision of the Profit ~haring Plan .
We are not persuaded that this is what Congress in-.
tended , Section 6 (c) has no independent existence ere-

'

.

:viERHfLL LY~CH, PfERCE. FENNEH k 8M1TH

'20

11

WAHl'~

atiHg some sort of spurwus umformity of application for
all States. [t has meaning only iu the context of thf'
assertion of a federal interest. and it hinges on our determination that the particular rule be integrally related
to or substantially effect the aims and purposes of the
Act. lt merely requires that any exchange rule adopted
outside the context of the Act be consist<>nt with the
laws of the :-ltatc in which the exchange is located.'"
If the rule is sought to be enforced in another State.
IIonnal conflicts principles come into play, and the rule's
effect depends on the resol utwn of that conflict. Were
this not so, there would be 110 purpose behind the choice
of law clause 111 the Profit Sharing Plan 1tse1f. More
unportantly . the uniform application Merrill Lynch's
Interpretation of the Act woukl purportedly foster is seen
to be ephemeral when one comiders that broker-dealers
like petitioner are also members of exchanges located
outside New York, and are therefore subJect, under the
"state of location" theory, to other 8tates · laws. In
effect, we arc asked to sacrifice the individual's expectation of uniform treatment in the State of his residence
for uniformity of application of the effect of au ex~
change's rules. We decline to do so because we believe
Tlw Act rontmn~ ot h('T' JH'OVIC>JOn~ mdicntlllg t lw IllTPilt of
that .,;tate law c·ontinuP>< to appl~ · where tlw Aet itself dor::;
not. Thu~, §2S(a), 15 U. 8. C. §iRbb(a) , ~tat('~ that the nght~
and n'medw::; provid ed b~ · thP Act ";;hall be Ill adchtwn to any and
all othPr rights and rPmPche" that may PXI:>t at law or in eqUity ."
It furtlwr prov1dPH that nothmg Ill the Art "c;hall affect thC' JUnsdiCt!On of the ::<Pcunw·~ commis::;wn . . of any State• . . m::;ofar a~ 1t
dor~ not ronftici With thC' prov1~1on::; " of tlw Aet "or thr rules and
rPgulatJOntl thPrPtmdC'r ... S('rtwn 2H (bJ, 15 l '- 8. C § i8bb (b),
provide::; that nothmg 111 th(' Art "~hall be con~trurd to modify exJ::;iing law
w1th rc•gard to the bmding elferi
of [ PxchangeJ
<H'tlon t akrn
. to c;Ptt iC' d1spute::; bet wpen Jt;:; mPmber~
on any
lJ('T'"on who h;tl' agreed to hr hound thrrrb'
1"

CongrP~::;
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that Congress intended that those elements of the old
regime of complete self-regulation, that is. those elements
not related to the federal obJectives, be subject to state
law and to established conflicts principles when their
application out-of-State comes into controversy. After
all, a stock exchange is organized as an association in
accordance with the laws of the State of its location.
Any asertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction contends, of
course. with the public policy of the State in which this
jurisdiction is sought. To ascribe more to ~ 6 (c) would
be contrary to the congresE.ional scheme and to what
might be regarded as common sense.
D. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN has stated.
"The principle to be derived from our decisions is
that federal regulation of a field of commerce should
110t be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power
tn the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the
11ature of the regulated subject matter permits no
other conclusion. or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained. ·· Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc . v. Paul, 373 l'. S. 132. 142 ( 1963) .
ln other contexts, pre-emption has been measured by
whether the state statute frustrates any part of the purpose of the federal legislation. Coloardo Anti-Discrimtnation Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U. :::1.
714, 724 ( 1963); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637
(1971); Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247,253-255
( 1947) . And only last term MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, in
speaking for the Court. observed that while prior cases
ou pre-emption ''are not precise guidelines," because "each
tums on the peculiarities and special features of the
federal regulatory scheme in question,'' it rs where there
is lll existence a pervasive and comprehensive scheme of
federal regulation that pre-emption follows in order to
fulfill the federal statutory purposPs. C'dy of Burbank
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'"· Lockheed Air Termmal, Inc., 411 U. S. 624, 638-639
( 1973) .
In the area of regulatiOn that we are considering here,
California has manifested a strong policy of protecting
its wage earners from what it regards as undesirable
economic pressures affecting the employment relationship. These policies prevail in the absence of interference with the federal regulatory scheme. We find no
such interference and we also find in the structure of the
Act an intent on the part of Congress that state policies
in this area should operate vigorously.
E. It is suggested, finally, that the petitioner's Profit
Sharing Plan operates on a national level; that it is open
to all eligible Merrill Lynch employees in the United
fitates; that the respondents' employment is interstate
111 nature, as is Merrill Lynch's business; and that the
application of the California statutes would unduly burden interstate commerce.
What has been said above provides the answer to this
argument. It is in line with the principle, long estab11she , that the National Government's power. under the
Commerce Clause, to regulate commerce does not exclude
all state power of regulation. Southern Pacific Co. v.
An.zona, 325 U. S. 761. 766-767 (1945); Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R. I . &
P. R . Co., 393 t:'. S. 129 (1968); Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960).
The .Judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.

It

1.s

so ordered ..
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